Azure Attack Surfaces





My User Properties



https://www.condignum.com/

Agenda

• Basics

- Terminology & Hierarchy
- Identity & Access Management (Entra ID & RBAC)
- Role-defined Attack Surfaces
 - Common Vectors
 - Attack Surface Reduction
- Takeaways
- Resources & Recommended materials



Terminology & Hierarchy



Zure = Cloud Computing Platform







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https://portal.azure.com/#allservices/category/All

Resources & Grouping

Resource (actual instance of a service)

Resource Group (logical grouping of resources)



\$ubscriptions

Resource Groups

Subscription (logical payment container)



Management Groups

Containers for subscriptions (not enabled by default)



Entra Tenant

Represents an organization

Maintains all assets inside (users, subscriptions, ...)

Dedicated Entra ID instance



Identity & Access Management

Entra ID & RBAC



Entra ID (Azure AD)

Identity & Access Management Service (handles authentication)

Unique instance per tenant Used by multiple Microsoft cloud platforms

There is no directory

Security Principals

Identity objects in Entra ID requesting access to Azure services







Manages access to Entra resources (Adding / Editing Users)

Azure Roles



Manages access to Azure resources



Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

HAS

Security Principal





















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Role-defined Attack Surfaces



Kill Chain Roles



© Dr Nestori Syynimaa

https://aadinternals.com/

OUTSIDER – Generic Attack Surfaces

Overly exposed resources

Vulnerable resources (App Service or Function App Abuse)

Insecure data storage

Malware/Credential Phishing

Weak credentials



OUTSIDER – Illicit Consent Grant

ATTACKER

Registered app with a set of non-admin permissions

Application's Service Principal is able to act on victim's behalf & query the APIs



✓ Read and write access to your mail

- 🗸 Send mail as you
- ✓ Sign you in and read your profile
- \checkmark Maintain access to data you have given it access to

Accepting these permissions means that you allow this app to use your data as specified in their terms of service and privacy statement. **The publisher has not provided links to their terms for you to review.** You can change these permissions at https://myapps.microsoft.com. Show details

Does this app look suspicious? Report it here



VICTIM

User receives a phishing mail with a link & accepts

<u>Users are allowed by</u> <u>default to consent</u>

OUTSIDER – Device Code Authentication

Used for logging in to devices with limited controls (Xbox, Kiosk terminals)

ATTACKER



Requests the code Sends verification link & code





Opens the link & enters the code - that's it

Legitimate Microsoft Domain No consent is requested Device code expires after <u>15 minutes</u>

OUTSIDER – Blob Storage Hunting

Equivalent of a S3 bucket in AWS Stores unstructured data (files, videos, ...)

Per default not publicly accessible

Might expose unwanted data (Credentials, DBs, Backups, ...)

Can be found in website sources, with google dorks or listen on shodan



OUTSIDER – Attack Surface Reduction

Strong password policy & enable MFA for all users

Awareness

Minimal infrastructure exposure



Do not allow user consent

(limited) Logging & Alert Rules

Proper Patch-Management

		Area	Default guest user permissions
GUEST – Permissie	ONS READ-ONLY	Users and contacts	 Read their own properties Read display name, email, sign-in name, photo, user principal name, and user type properties of other users and contacts Change their own password Search for another user by object ID (if allowed) Read manager and direct report information of other users
	access by default	Groups	 Read properties of non-hidden groups, including membership and ownership (even non-joined groups) Read hidden Microsoft 365 group memberships for joined groups Search for groups by display name or object ID (if allowed)
		Applications	 Read properties of registered and enterprise applications List permissions granted to applications
		Devices	No permissions
		Organization	 Read company display name Read all domains Read configuration of certificate-based authentication

GUEST – Public Teams

ے Activity	Teams ···· = +	General Posts Files ~ +
(=) Chat		+ New ∨ → T Upload ∨ 目 Edit in grid view 🖉
Teams		Documents > General
	Your teams	□ Name ∽
Calendar (2	General	
Calls		 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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Self-join



View & share data

GUEST – Unrestricted File Share

Sharing settings General	(j)	\times
Share the link with		
Anyone ①		\bigcirc
People in GmbH ①		\bigcirc
People with existing access ①		0
People you choose Share with specific people you choose inside or outside of condignum GmbH, using their name, group, or email.		٢
More settings		
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GUEST – Untrusted Apps



GUEST – Attack Surface Reduction

Create app permission policies for Teams

Restrict File-Sharing to <u>Users</u> with existing access only



<u>Users</u> should only create private teams

<u>Very restrictive Guest roles</u> (need-to-know)

Establish conditional access policies

INSIDER – Default Permissions

Invite Guests

Add up to 50 devices to Azure

Create new applications

Create Security Groups

INSIDER – Dynamic Group Memberships

Rules to automatically join groups

Can be an efficient access control



Memberships are updated in "real-time"

Designed to reduce Group management efforts

INSIDER – Insecure Azure Role Configuration



Overly permissive roles

Lack of Segmentation

INSIDER – Attack Surface Reduction

Properly segment your resources

Follow a multi-tenant approach



<u>Users</u> should only create private teams

Fine tune your dynamic group membership rules

Follow the **least-privilege** & **kneed-to-know** principles, when **defining & assigning** roles

Takeaways



Focus on permissions & access controls (role definition & assignment)

Don't trust default settings

Azure will not protect you from service vulnerabilities Everything compromised might have an identity

Resources

Images & Icons:

• https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/image/microsoftcorp/geographies-hero?resMode=sharp2&op_usm=1.5,0.65,15,0&wid=2880&qlt=100&fit=constrain

- <u>https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/image/microsoftcorp/products-</u> hero?resMode=sharp2&op_usm=1.5,0.65,15,0&wid=2880&qlt=100&fit=constrain
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/icons/
- <u>https://www.svgrepo.com/</u>
- https://www.riskinsight-wavestone.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Imagebis.png
- <u>https://aadinternals.com/images/posts/killchain.png</u>
- https://aadinternals.com/post/phishing/

Recommended material

Free hosted hands-on trainings (mini CTFs)

- <u>https://azure.enterprisesecurity.io/</u>
- <u>https://dartctf.enterprisesecurity.io/</u>

Mini Training Ranges (self-hosted)

- <u>https://github.com/ine-labs/AzureGoat</u>
- <u>https://github.com/mandiant/Azure_Workshop</u>
- <u>https://github.com/XMCyber/XMGoat</u>

Book + Labs (\$)

• <u>https://github.com/PacktPublishing/Penetration-Testing-Azure-for-Ethical-Hackers</u>

Trainings (\$\$\$)

- <u>https://training.xintra.org/attacking-and-defending-azure-m365</u>
- <u>https://www.alteredsecurity.com/azure-basic</u>
- <u>https://www.netspi.com/training/dark-side-ops-azure-cloud-pentesting/</u>
- <u>https://cloudbreach.io/</u>

Penetration Testing Information

- https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Cloud%20-%20Azure%20Pentest.md
- <u>https://www.cobalt.io/blog/azure-ad-pentesting-fundamentals</u>
- <u>https://github.com/Kyuu-Ji/Awesome-Azure-Pentest</u>

Further readings

- <u>https://csandker.io/2022/10/19/Untangling-Azure-Permissions.html</u>
- <u>https://csandker.io/2022/11/10/Untangling-Azure-II-Privileged-Access.html</u>
- <u>https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-azure-api-permissions-abuse-74aee1006f48</u>
- <u>https://aadintemals.com/post/</u>

Follow them for up2date information

- <u>https://twitter.com/nikhil_mitt</u>
- <u>https://twitter.com/DrAzureAD</u>
- <u>https://twitter.com/DirectoryRanger</u>
- <u>https://twitter.com/XintraOrg</u>
- <u>https://twitter.com/0xcsandker</u>
- <u>https://twitter.com/_wald0</u>



Penetration Testing Azure for Ethical Hackers

Develop practical skills to perform pentesting and risk assessment of Microsoft Azure environments





Focus on the **<u>ROLES</u>** an attacker gained access to, rather than which resources were compromised



