Utilman is back

Bypassing BitLocker and Windows Logon with DMA

💳 Bundesministerium

Klimaschutz, Umwelt, Energie, Mobilität, Innovation und Technologie

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A Little Bit of History



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How Does This Work? (Video-Demo)



https://youtu.be/A565BO0p5Yw

whoami /all

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Penetration testing of Windows clients, internal networks and Active Directory

Domain Admin in **your** Active Directory (?)

Today's Scope



BitLocker Killed Our Exploit 😥

We cannot modify data on encrypted drives

What if we know the BitLocker PIN or there is none?

TPM (Trusted Platform Module)

Special hardware for cryptographic operations

Stores and protects our BitLocker key and only releases it if the boot process is unaltered

Boot Process Security



The Check Fails

BitLocker recovery

Enter the recovery key for this drive

Use the number keys or function keys F1-F10 (use F10 for 0). Recovery key ID (to identify your key): ABD09F3E-C04C-4C8F-B2AE-CF0253006F7B

Here's how to find your key:

- Sign in on another device and go to: http://custom.url.contoso.com
- Try your Microsoft account at: aka.ms/myrecoverykey
- For more information go to: aka.ms/recoverykeyfaq

BitLocker Modes

The good – TPM and PIN

The bad and default – TPM only

and the ugly – without TPM (better than nothing)

TPM and PIN

BitLocker

Enter the PIN to unlock this drive

Use the number keys or function keys F1-F10 (use F10 for 0).

Press the Insert key to see the PIN as you type.

TPM only







Where Can We Attack?

Let's just attack the Windows logon!

And I am not talking about brute force attacks

DMA (Direct Memory Access)

Allows hardware to access RAM independently of the CPU

Your graphics card uses this!

Does Anybody Remember This?



What's This New Thing?



Kernel DMA Protection



https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt

There Is Another Way

PCI Express also allows Direct Memory Access

And most devices have PCIe (maybe over M.2)

Let's Try It Out! (Live-Demo)

We will have to do some work



What Is Vulnerable?

- Full volume encryption without pre-boot authentication
- Full volume encryption with pre-boot authentication if the PIN is known to the attacker

Countermeasures

Pre-boot authentication (BitLocker PIN)

Protects against thieves

Does not protect against local privilege escalation by a legitimate user

Additional Countermeasures

- Virtualization Based Security
- Kernel DMA Protection

These need hardware support! (and correct BitLocker configuration)

Key Takeaways (1/2)

- Use pre-boot authentication to protect against outside attackers
 - Also protects against attacks on TPM

Key Takeaways (2/2)

- Do not assume that local privilege escalation is impossible (see various other vulnerabilities)
- Secure your Active Directory! This is where your crown jewels are!

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Further Information

- 1. Utilman Attack Video: <u>https://youtu.be/A565BO0p5Yw</u>
- 2. Utilman Attack Explained: <u>http://index-of.es/Exploit/EN-</u> Bypass%20windows%20server%202008.pdf
- 3. BitLocker Countermeasures: <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/countermeasures</u>
- 4. Virtualization based security: <u>https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs</u>
- 5. TPM platform validation profiles: <u>https://admx.help/?Category=MDOP&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.BitLockerManagement::Platfor</u> <u>mValidation_UEFI_Name</u>
- 6. PCILeech: https://github.com/ufrisk/pcileech
- 7. TPM-Fail Attack: <u>https://tpm.fail/</u>
- 8. This attack shown by somebody else: <u>https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/practical-dma-attack-on-windows-10.html</u>