

BEYOND HONEYPOTS

Practical Cyber Deception for Real Systems

IT Security Community Exchange

IT-SECX · October 3, 2025 · St. Pölten, AT



PRESENTER

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
whoami



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github.com/blu3r4y



LinkedIn

Cloud Security · Kubernetes · Containers · Linux · eBPF
Cyber Deception · Honeytokens · Honeypots
Game Theory · Machine Learning

Imagine an attacker infiltrated your network ...



You're the attacker. Where should we go first?

```
k9s
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/# ls -l
total 64
lrwxrwxrwx   1 root root    7 Sep  8 00:00 bin -> usr/bin
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Aug 24 16:05 boot
drwxr-xr-x   5 root root  360 Sep 29 10:50 dev
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep  8 21:14 docker-entrypoint.d
-rwxr-xr-x   1 root root 1620 Sep  8 21:13 docker-entrypoint.sh
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 etc
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Aug 24 16:05 home
lrwxrwxrwx   1 root root    7 Sep  8 00:00 lib -> usr/lib
lrwxrwxrwx   1 root root    9 Sep  8 00:00 lib64 -> usr/lib64
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Sep  8 00:00 media
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Sep  8 00:00 mnt
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Sep  8 00:00 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 237 root root    0 Sep 29 10:50 proc
drwx-----   1 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:09 root
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 run
lrwxrwxrwx   1 root root    8 Sep  8 00:00 sbin -> usr/sbin
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Sep  8 00:00 srv
dr-xr-xr-x  12 root root    0 Sep 29 10:50 sys
drwxrwxrwt   2 root root 4096 Sep  8 00:00 tmp
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep  8 00:00 usr
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep  8 00:00 var
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/# |
```

~/

```
k9s
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:~# ls -la
total 20
drwx----- 1 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:09 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 ..
-rw----- 1 root root  114 Sep 29 11:50 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  571 Apr 10  2021 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  161 Jul  9  2019 .profile
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:~# |
```

/run/secrets/

```
k9s
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# ls -la
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:50 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:50 .aws
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 kubernetes.io
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# |
```

/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/

```
k9s
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# ls -la
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:50 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:50 .aws
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 kubernetes.io
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# ls -l kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/
total 0
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 13 Sep 29 10:50 ca.crt → ../data/ca.crt
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 Sep 29 10:50 namespace → ../data/namespace
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 12 Sep 29 10:50 token → ../data/token
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# cat kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkdCMTFYbGN3cFhHUEcybUJpX1ZySTFwN1hsdDdWYklCQjLWRHcifQ.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_oadgiFJHJNm1r1WJdAJ1q57LPUTlgfmi-XpcDQPUqVMctbKssfXXEyKIAi8uVW-7Fui_x1AicFY90WORlhp81asmYW1zT85NdGJNw11zUESa0ZGr7H0CrtzNGFUNukCpvkFUAcinZY_dc3W9V3CLCA3fQsfZiOT8hHtsvr36p4uiSRNd9NF6rBVbh4L5D5vHKubB8zrrsy4Ml1dm_NfhSNRdCaUESTd0lg-xCJnTgKxqiXltglkhL6cABA_M5e6pE8CzJhVTHgVUvplS_poSPoWexjCTbFFG_BfrOC64vzgHBzfWK34ZWk6M0ncg-rMNUFMSkAroot@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets#
```


/run/secrets/.aws/

```
k9s
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# ls -la
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:50 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 29 11:50 .aws
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Sep 29 10:50 kubernetes.io
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# ls -l .aws
total 4
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 371 Sep 29 11:50 credentials
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# cat .aws/credentials
[default]
aws_access_key_id = FZWGQYZRVMVQKCWXWJ
aws_secret_access_key = ToDNS2V5wkEuPmfocmNDHiVBspaywo
region = us-east-1

[staging]
aws_access_key_id = BPDHLBUJTYMKRVBMNB
aws_secret_access_key = Jf4mTvTG5zbLksf464nYwEVyDkbjdp
region = eu-central-1

[prod]
aws_access_key_id = GQRMWAXADTVUPFMZJ
aws_secret_access_key = gUFQzyJWJSkMkWpay4Umxzg4oFkkju
root@koney-demo-deployment-57c9b68df6-fx6q8:/run/secrets# |
```


What is Cyber Deception?




We can place **honeytokens**, install **fake endpoints**, and inject **deceptive content** to ...

- **slow-down attackers** by expending their “energy”
- **assist defenders** with strong indicators of compromise

[1]

Honeypots and Honeytokens



'Classic' honeypots are isolated fake applications, reachable over the network (e.g., to collect threat intel)




Talk Focus


Honeytokens & application layer deception techniques are traps embedded into applications & systems

[1]

Creating Effective Traps



Deploying Traps



The Honeyquest Study [2]



github.com/dynatrace-
oss/honeyquest



GitHub

```
0 0 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
0 0 Date: Tue, 02 May 2025 04:32:14 GMT
6 0 Server: Apache/1.0.3 (Debian)
7 3 Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=hLAGcA9qClz36k0r71sSgw; path=/
0 0 Pragma: no-cache
0 0 Vary: Accept-Encoding
1 0 Transfer-Encoding: chunked
5 1 X-Kube-ApiServer: /hko/api
0 0 Content-Type: text/html

# Hack #
# Trap #
```

Neutral Elements

Risky Element

e.g., a true indicator of
vulnerability CVE-1999-0067

Deceptive Element

Traps injected by us

What is your
next step?



number of marks placed by participants (n=47)

Which trap is better?



passwords.txt




config.ini


Which trap is better?



passwords.txt



config.ini



Which trap is better?



private-key.pem




backup.tar.gz


Which trap is better?



private-key.pem



backup.tar.gz



Which trap is better?

</>

X-DevToken:



eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI...

</>

Set-Cookie:



DATA=YWRtZW90Zm2U%3D

Which trap is better?



X-DevToken:


eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI...



Set-Cookie:


DATA=YWRtZW90Zm2U%3D

Which trap is better?



GET

`https://github.com
/owner/my_repo
/settings/secrets
/58975/read
200 OK`



GET


`https://github.com
/rest/user/login
?user=johnson
&password=carrot13
200 OK`

Which trap is better?




GET

`https://github.com/owner/my_repo/settings/secrets/58975/read`
200 OK



GET

`https://github.com/rest/user/login?user=johnson&password=carrot13`
200 OK



The Honeyquest Study [2]



github.com/dynatrace-oss/honeyquest



GitHub

File System		18	443		42%	21%	21%	16%	139	39%
DF1	private-key.pem	2	32		66%	22%			17	35%
DF2	backup.tar.gz	2	38		61%	24%			19	42%
DF3	keys.json	3	86		52%	26%			37	51%
DF4	card3rz_reg_details.html [75]	2	43		31%	19%	19%		15	47%
DF5	passwords.txt	2	41		46%	24%			12	25%
DF6	customer_list_2010.html [75]	2	53		43%	23%	23%		17	29%
DF7	config.ini	2	45		38%	40%	20%		15	33%
DF8	SPAM_list.pdf [75]	2	58		17%	21%	45%	17%	7	14%
DF9	Rowe et al. [83, 82]	1	47		15%	19%		57%	0	-
.htaccess Files		5	128		34%	21%			14	36%
DH1	Admin Redirect	5	128		34%	21%			14	36%
HTTP Responses		23	456		36%	30%	22%		103	24%
DP1	Developer Token	7	137		55%	20%	15%		46	33%
DP2	Cookie [54, 87, 88]	2	48		40%	15%	29%	16%	13	38%
DP3	API Server	7	134		30%	30%			21	5%
DP4	Proxy Referer	7	137		22%	47%	24%		23	17%
HTTP Requests		25	534		30%	22%	37%		57	53%
DS1	IDOR Secrets [87]	1	12		58%		42%		2	-
DS2	Clear-Text Pass. [88]	1	28		54%	36%			12	67%
DS3	SESSID Param. [54]	2	58		40%	16%	26%	18%	10	70%
DS4	Path Traversal [88]	5	122		39%	20%	27%		10	40%
DS5	Admin Param. [54, 77]	2	49		37%	22%	27%		6	50%
DS6	Unescaped JS [88]	2	21		33%		57%		0	-
DS7	System Param. [54, 88]	1	28		29%	29%	42%		4	-
DS8	Developer Endpoint	4	80		24%	26%	42%		6	33%
DS9	Unspaced JSON [88]	2	22		23%	32%	40%		3	-
DS10	Mass Assignment	2	44			30%	54%		2	-
DS11	Log Endpoint	3	70			31%	59%		2	-



BEFORE



AFTER

More research results and suggestions for designing “enticing” traps.

Research findings on placing traps that reduce the risk of exploiting genuine security weaknesses.

Creating Effective Traps



Deploying Traps



“Deception-As-Code” with Koney [3]




github.com/dynatrace-
oss/koney



Git Hub

...instead of manually deciphering techniques from academic papers.



Cyber Deception Policy Documents

```
honeytoken.yaml  YAML

apiVersion: koney.io/v1alpha1
kind: DeceptionPolicy
spec:
  traps:
    - filesystemHoneytoken:
        filePath: /run/secrets/token
        fileContent: "secret"
    match:
      any:
        - resources:
            selector:
              matchLabels:
                op/honeytoken: true
    🍲 decoyDeployment:
        strategy: containerExec
    📷 captorDeployment:
        strategy: tetragon
```



Trap-specific parameters



Criteria for selecting the Kubernetes workloads (e.g., containers) in which to deploy the traps




[Decoy. \[4\]](#) Strategy to deploy the trap itself



[Captor. \[4\]](#) Strategy for monitoring the trap

Placing Honeytokens by Executing Shell Commands



honeytoken.yaml


YAML

```
apiVersion: koney.io/v1alpha1
kind: DeceptionPolicy
spec:
  traps:
    - filesystemHoneytoken:
        filePath: /run/secrets/token
        fileContent: "secret"
  match:
    any:
      - resources:
          selector:
            matchLabels:
              op/honeytoken: true
  decoyDeployment:
    strategy: containerExec
  captorDeployment:
    strategy: tetragon
```

File Access Monitoring with eBPF



“eBPF makes the kernel programmable.”– We hook the kprobe `security_file_permissions` to detect honeypot access attempts.



Koney uses **Tetragon**, which simplifies deploying eBPF programs in Kubernetes.

Koney Alert Example

alert.json

JSON

```
{
  "timestamp": "2025-06-02T11:17:02Z",
  "deception_policy_name": "deceptionpolicy-servicetoken",
  "trap_type": "filesystem_honeytoken",
  "metadata": { "file_path": "/run/secrets/koney/service_token" },
  "pod": {
    "name": "koney-demo-deployment-5bcbd78875-45qpn",
    "namespace": "koney-demo",
    "container": {
      "id": "docker://e19c1827e255ce7a5c5fd74eb4ee861388f83a16410effd65e30d3b051cd815f",
      "name": "nginx"
    }
  },
  "process": {
    "pid": 148373, "uid": 0, "cwd": "/", "binary": "/usr/bin/cat",
    "arguments": "/run/secrets/koney/service_token"
  }
}
```

Beyond Honeypots



Application Layer Cyber Deception

Place honeytokens.
Add deceptive HTTP endpoints.
Modify HTTP headers and bodies.

Enticing Traps

“backup.tar.gz”, not “passwords.txt”.
Imitate true system components.



“Deception-As-Code”


Formalize traps with
policy documents.

Deceive. Test. Repeat.

Deploy small traps.
Share insights.



What is Cyber Deception?




We can place **honeytokens**, install **fake endpoints**, and inject **deceptive content** to ...

- slow-down attackers by expending their “energy”
- assist defenders with strong indicators of compromise

The Honeyquest Study [2]


github.com/dynatrace-oss/honeyquest




“Deception-As-Code” with Koney [3]

github.com/dynatrace-oss/koney

... instead of manually deciphering techniques from academic papers.



Beyond Honeypots





CLOUD DONE RIGHT

APPENDIX

Adding Fake Routes to Web Applications

aws-credentials.yaml

YAML

```
apiVersion: koney.io/v1alpha1
kind: DeceptionPolicy
spec:
  traps:
    - httpResponse:
        request:
          match: /.aws/credentials$ # ends with
          method: GET # GET only
        response:
          status: 200
          headers:
            Content-Type: text/plain
          body: |
            aws_access_key_id = ASLPVFCMPNXCFOX
            aws_secret_access_key = h8aQcFM64
  match:
    any:
      - resources:
          ports: [80, 8080]
          selector:
            matchLabels:
              op/aws-credentials: true
```

disallow-injection.yaml

YAML

```
apiVersion: koney.io/v1alpha1
kind: DeceptionPolicy
spec:
  traps:
    - httpBodyMutation:
        request:
          match: ^/robots.txt$
          method: GET
        response:
          matchHeaders:
            Content-Type: text/html
          bodyMutations:
            - engine: regex
              match: (?s)(.*)
              replace: "$1\nDisallow: /.aws/credentials"
  match:
    any:
      - resources:
          selector:
            matchLabels:
              op/disallow-injection: true
```

File Access Monitoring with eBPF via Tetragon



policy.yaml

YAML

[5]

```
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
  name: monitor-honeytoken
spec:
  kprobes:
    - call: security_file_permission
      syscall: false
      return: true
      args:
        - index: 0
          type: file
        - index: 1
          type: int
      returnArg:
        index: 0
        type: int
      returnArgAction: Post
  selectors:
    - matchArgs:
        - index: 0
          operator: Prefix
          values:
            - /run/secrets/token
```



Tetragon is a Kubernetes Operator that simplifies the creation of “tracing policies” in K8s clusters.

Falco and **Tracee** are popular alternatives.



[5] K. Kourtis and A. Papagiannis, “File Monitoring with eBPF and Tetragon (Part 1),” Isovalent Blog. Accessed: Feb. 2025. [Online]. Available: <https://isovalent.com/blog/post/file-monitoring-with-ebpf-and-tetragon-part-1/>

APPENDIX

Related Projects

patrickpichler/
beesting



1 Contributor

0 Issues

7 Stars

0 Forks



San7o/hive-operator



Kubernetes operator for kernel tracing of inode accesses with eBPF programs

1 Contributor

0 Issues

5 Stars

0 Forks



utkusen/baitroute



A web honeypot library to create vulnerable-looking endpoints to detect and mislead attackers

2 Contributors

2 Issues

404 Stars

17 Forks



DataDog/HASH



HASH (HTTP Agnostic Software Honeypot)

6 Contributors

2 Used by

140 Stars

8 Forks



Check for updates

Hidden in Plain Sight: Filesystem View Separation for Data Integrity and Deception

Teryl Taylor¹(✉), Frederico Araujo¹(✉), Anne Kohlbrenner², and Marc Ph. Stoecklin¹

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Session 2: Novel MTD Frameworks and Techniques

MTD'18, October 15, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada

Cloxy: A Context-aware Deception-as-a-Service Reverse Proxy for Web Services

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ABSTRACT

Legacy software, outdated applications and fast changing technologies pose a serious threat to information security. Several domains, such as long-life industrial control systems and Internet of Things devices, suffer from it. In many cases, system updates and new acquisitions are not an option. In this paper, a framework that combines a reverse proxy with various deception-based defense mechanisms is presented. It is designed to autonomously provide deception methods to web applications. Context-awareness and minimal configuration overhead make it perfectly suited to work as a service. The framework is built modularly to provide flexibility and adaptability to the application use case. It is evaluated with common web-based applications such as content management systems and several frequent attack vectors against them. Furthermore, the security and performance implications of the additional security layer are quantified and discussed. It is found that, given sound implementation, no further attack vectors are introduced to the web application. The performance of the prototypical framework increases the delay of communication with the underlying web application. This delay is within tolerable boundaries and can be further reduced by a more efficient implementation.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Security and privacy → Network security; Security services; Intrusion detection systems; Distributed systems security; • Networks → Web protocol security;

KEYWORDS

Information security, Network security, Deception, Moving target defense, Honeytokens

ACM Reference Format:
Daniel Fraunholz, Daniel Reti, Simon Duque Anton and Hans Dieter Schotten. 2018. Cloxy: A Context-aware Deception-as-a-Service Reverse Proxy for Web Services. In 5th ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense (MTD '18), October 15, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 8 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3268966.3268973>

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MTD '18, October 15, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada.
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6031-4/18/10...\$15.00
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3268966.3268973>

1 INTRODUCTION

Electronic crime is a prosperous field of activity for malicious actors. In total monetary gain, it exceeds the global income generated by drug traffic [16], causing losses quantified to \$1,070,000,000 [17] in the United States of America. On a global scale, this amount is expected to reach \$2.1 trillion by 2019 [26]. Web services and their corresponding protocols are most frequently employed for communication in the Internet, and therefore a target frequently exploited by criminals. This is not only true for common services, such as news, banking and entertainment, but also for industrial control systems and other critical infrastructures. Legacy applications are frequently not protected properly as no updates are available or the manufacturer is no longer active. Misconfigurations, weak credentials and code injection vulnerabilities such as SQL injections are exploited as well. Deception-based security methods can add an additional layer of security, thus increasing the security level of systems that would be considered as insecure otherwise.

This work is structured as follows: First, the problem is defined and the requirements for the proxy server are determined in section 2. The background of this research is introduced and defense deception methods are reviewed in section 3. After that, common elements in web communication are elaborated in the context of the previously introduced deception methods. In section 4, the system design is explained in detail from a software engineering as well as a networking perspective. The system is evaluated in respect to security aspects and performance in section 5. A conclusion of the proposed system is given in section 6.

2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Frequent updates and application level firewalls aid security, but absolute security is not achievable. Particularly web services are available for a defined user group, often for the public. This makes them susceptible to attacks by default. This work aims at increasing the security of an application server on the application layer, independent of the application and its security mechanics. The proposed approach employs the security method of deception in order to mitigate common web attacks, while still providing satisfactory user experience. This motivates the following requirements:

Requirement 1 Each web communication is relayed. Bypassing the proxy server must be prohibited.

Requirement 2 HTTP/HTTPS is fully supported. No functional restrictions are introduced, thus not degrading service availability.

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[6] DeCyFS

[7] Cloxy

[6] T. Taylor, F. Araujo, A. Kohlbrenner, and M. Ph. Stoecklin, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Filesystem View Separation for Data Integrity and Deception,” in Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, C. Giuffrida, S. Bardin, and G. Blanc, Eds., in DIMVA '18. Saclay, France: Springer International Publishing, Jun. 2018, pp. 256–278. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-93411-2_12.

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