

MFAngler-automated M365 phishing framework

IT-SECX 2025

_

03.10.2025






Agenda


- Teach a man to phish...
- MFA Enters the Chat
- Introducing MFAngler
- 04 Demos: Initial Access & Automated Persistence
- Field test
- Limitations & Conclusion

Teach a man to Phish...


1: Copy Target Site



2: Send out Phishing Mails



3: Wait...



Teach a man to Phish

We use phishing in a number of assessments, mainly

- dedicated Social Engineering assessments
- **Initial Access Assessments**
- Red Team Projects








Teach a man to Phish...

We run into certain problems with that approach in more recent time ...





MFA Enters the Chat






6

MFA Enters the Chat

- Username and Password alone not sufficient anymore
- More interaction by the user needed
- Additional persistence techniques required
- Simple phishing-templates don't work anymore





...and immediately overdoes it

- SMS/Call
- TOTP
- Azure MFA (proprietary)
- Passkey*
- Other third party (DUO/PingID)
- Hardware Second Factor





What did that mean for us?

We needed a solution for assessments that

- Can handle MFA during phishing campaigns
- Does not (immediatelly) trigger defense mechanisms
- Can handle a large number of logins at the same time/in short time
- Is (somewhat) autonomous
- Can be reused
- Allows us to keep logging in (Persistence)
- ... has a cool (Al generated) name





Introducing MFAngler


MFA Phishing-Toolkit for Microsoft Azure Login Workflow

Features:

- Multi-Threaded browser emulation through Selenium
- Automated setup parameterized to customize behaviour and design
- Multiple MFA options for login
- **Dockerized**




MFAngler Architecture






Initial Access






DEMO: Using MFAngler to gain access to an M365 Portal






But wait, there is more...





But wait, there is more...





Introducing MFAngler


MFA Phishing-Toolkit for Microsoft Azure Login Workflow

Features:

- Multi-Threaded browser emulation through Selenium
- Automated setup parameterized to customize behaviour and design
- Multiple MFA options for login and for persistence
- **Dockerized**
- Persistence through adding MFA to account



DEMO: Automated Persistence with MFAngler






Field test

The timeline:

- 1 minute after sending, the first account was fully compromised
- 15 minutes later we saw reaction: E-Mails withdrawn from inboxes, URL and IPs blocked



75%

10%

0%

of people who input passwords had additional MFA added

changed password

removed the added MFA



But wait...

Evilginx exists???

- a proxy between victim and legitimate login site
- taking requests and forwarding them directly to the login sites

einer private English company limited by quarantee, angeschlossen sind. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. KPMG und das KPMG-Logo sind eingetragene Markenzeichen von KPMG International

has it's own problems with detections (i.e. check window.location)

Comparison

- Proxy vs. Emulation
- Redirect vs. Cloning

Source: https://evilginx.com/




Limitations

- Only for Microsoft Azure Login Portal
- Only applicable for M365 native login workflow (non federated)
- Updates in the UI flow by Microsoft -> Manual adjustment needed
- Device-based Conditional Access
- Hardware Tokens


Future Development

- Include Passkey Authentication
- Decouple emulation code and phishing frontend further
- Refactor emulation code #vibecoding





Future Development - Passkeys





Conclusion

- Used MFAngler successfully in multiple engagements since last year
- Worked with several different Microsoft tenants across multiple countries within the KPMG network
- No additional detection evasion needed
- Not every "phishing resistant MFA" is safe from every form of phishing attack
- Phishing is dead, long live phishing!



Teach a man to *MFA* Phish ...



















kpmg.at

© 2025 KPMG Advisory GmbH, eine österreichische Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung und ein Mitglied der globalen KPMG Organisation unabhängiger Mitgliedsfirmen, die KPMG International Limited, einer private English company limited by guarantee, angeschlossen sind. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. KPMG und das KPMG-Logo sind eingetragene Markenzeichen von KPMG International.

Document Classification: KPMG Public

MS Authentication Types

Authentication method combination	MFA strength	Passwordless MFA strength	Phishing-resistant MFA strength
FIDO2 security key			✓
Windows Hello for Business			
Certificate-based authentication (Multi-Factor)			$\overline{\mathbf{v}}$
Microsoft Authenticator (Phone Sign-in)			
Temporary Access Pass (One-time use AND Multi-use)			
Password + something you have ¹			
Federated single-factor + something you have ¹			
Federated Multi-Factor			
Certificate-based authentication (single-factor)			
SMS sign-in			
Password			
Federated single-factor			



Password Manager Passkey Support

	Р	assword Manag	er Landscape: Pa	asskey Support			
Password Manager	■ Windows	₡ macOS	∆ Linux (out of scope)	€ ios	€ iPadOS	Android	Browser Extensions
1Password	<u>~</u>	Mac >=14	×	>=17		>=14	V
Bitwarden	▽	✓	×	~		✓	<u>~</u>
N DASHLANE	~	Mac >=14	×	>=17		>=14	~
Poss Samsung Pass	×	×	×	×	×	>=7 (Samsung Devices)	(Not Needed)
Google Password Manager	(via chrome) requires TPM >= 129	(via chrome) >= 129		(via chrome) >= 17 >= Chrome 132	(via chrome) >= 17 >= Chrome 132	(default on Android)	(Chrome only unless used as Native Store)
NordPass*	~	<u>~</u>	×	>=17		>=14	~
(KEEPER	<u>~</u>	~	×	>=17		>=14	~
Enpass	~	<u>~</u>	×	>=17		>=14	~
Proton	(Web)	(Web)	×	>=17		>=14	~
(i) KeePassXC	<u>~</u>	~	×	(3rd-Party Apps)	×	(3rd-Party Apps)	X Safari (3rd- Party)



